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R ecent changes in the international system and resulting shifts in US military engagement abroad have opened the
door for a new examination of military opportunities for women, an issue which has for too long been clouded by
extreme positions on both sides.[1] The view that a fatal feminization of the US Army is occurring at the present time
is incorrect, but so is the claim that equal rights are immediately in order. A little moderation in the debate over the
issue of combat roles for women in the US military is needed. It is our belief that moderation will result from a simple
cost-benefit analysis rooted in the American democratic tradition. The timing for this is made even more appropriate
by the Army's current embrace of transformation.
We will first examine the current policy on women in combat units, then look at changes in the international system
and in the current and future missions of the military which allow a reconsideration of the issue. After arguing that the
functional imperative of military forces in the post-Cold War world has changed fundamentally while Department of
Defense policy on women in combat has changed only incrementally, we will recommend an experiment to determine
whether there should be changes to current Department of Defense policy.[2] We will then present what we consider
to be the very real problems the military would face with a mixed-gender force in combat roles before concluding that
the benefits of conducting an experiment are worth the costs. While our discussion of the topic is relevant to all
branches of the military, we primarily focus on the Army because of our personal experience, in combat and
peacetime, in that organization.
Unfortunately, much of the current debate surrounding the presence of women in the positions in which they now
serve is extremist and destructive. Women currently serve in division military police companies, fly combat aircraft,
and attend the US Military Academy; it is highly unlikely that there will be a rollback, despite the wishes of many who
oppose the presence of women in uniform. Brian Mitchell's recently published Women in the Military: Flirting with
Disaster concludes that "women are no longer needed in the military [and] their expanding presence is destroying the
military's body and soul."[3] Even if, as Mitchell argues, political correctness put women in the military in the first
place, it is unlikely that they will be removed, as there are no indications that society's sensitivity toward issues such as
this is diminishing. In addition, at least since the inception of the all-volunteer Army, the United States has never filled
the Army exclusively with male recruits. When the dialogue surrounding the debate on women's roles is not forwardlooking but rather looking to find a scapegoat for the troubles plaguing the military today, problems attributed to the
presence of women are exacerbated. This article attempts to tone down the rhetoric while examining the facts.
Current Policy on Women in Combat Units
In times of national emergency, traditional restrictions on gender roles tend to be eased. Some 33,000 women served in
the US armed forces during World War I, most in the Nurse Corps; more than ten times that number served during
World War II. In the wake of those national emergencies, traditional restrictions were again applied; the Women's
Armed Services Integration Act of 1948 permitted no more than two percent of the enlisted ranks in the Army to be
filled by women, a limit which was not lifted until another national emergency in 1967.[4]
Women became an increasingly important part of the military after the creation of the all-volunteer force in 1973, and
they demonstrated that they had become essential to the successful employment of the military during the Persian Gulf
War of 1990-91, in which some 40,000 women served, representing seven percent of the total deployed forces.[5] The
combat exclusion rule was revealed as dubious during that conflict, as women served in logistics bases forward of allmale infantry and armor units, but not on aircraft carriers hundreds of miles to the rear of the front lines. After that
conflict, opportunities for women were expanded, and women were given the opportunity to serve in combat planes

and on combat ships. The November 1993 law that repealed the Naval Combatant Exclusion Law also required the
Secretary of Defense to:
Ensure that qualification for and continuance in occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of a
common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender; Refrain from the use of gender
quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; and Refrain from changing
occupational standards simply to increase or decrease the number of women in an occupational career
field.[6]
To comply with that law, in January 1994 the Secretary of Defense lifted the "risk rule" which had prevented women
from serving in units which had a high probability of engaging in combat, partly in recognition of the fact that given
the changing nature of warfare there were no longer any"safe" places on the battlefield. Instead, women were
prohibited from serving in units that were designed and intended to engage in direct ground combat, defined as
"engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew-served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to
a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat [normally] takes
place well forward on the battlefield while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or
shock effect."[7]
These laws opened many more positions to women; in the Army, only five military occupational career fields remain
closed to women, either because these positions are clearly ground combat positions or because the units and positions
are doctrinally required to collocate and remain with direct combat units.[8] The officer career fields that remain
closed to women are infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, short-range air defense artillery, and special forces.[9]
These specialties comprise about a third of the assignments in the Army and are traditionally among the most critical
routes to high command positions. In addition, they are culturally and functionally considered to be the positions of
greatest significance to the defense mission.[10]
A Historic Opportunity for Change
The end of the Cold War dramatically changed the international environment and altered the role the US military can
expect to play in the world.[11] These changes provide an opportunity to rethink the current balance between the
functional imperatives of military service and the individual rights of female service members.
Members of the armed forces surrender a number of their individual rights as citizens when they take the oath to
"protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic."[12] For instance,
they lose the right to decide where they will live and work, what they will wear, even how they will wear their hair.
The more restrictive regulations under which they labor are essential to military discipline, to the smooth functioning
of an organization under the most difficult situations imaginable. The functional imperative of military service requires
that they surrender these rights in order for the military to perform its assigned function of protecting the rest of
society--and giving society the freedom to enjoy many of the same privileges which members of the military have
forfeited.[13]
One of the most interesting parts of this balancing act between individual liberty and the functional imperative of
military service is that the American democratic society values individual rights above all else, while the military
culture is founded on the subordination of the individual to the group. Military units, not individual soldiers, win wars,
and the military must diminish the rights of the individuals who serve in it in order to create effective units.
However, the functional imperative has its limits. It can be used to justify infringements upon the liberty of military
service members only when its demands are essential for military effectiveness. The military has no just reason to limit
the rights of service members in ways that go beyond the functional imperatives of military effectiveness. When it does
so, it risks losing the support of society--an essential factor for any military, but particularly for an all-volunteer
military in a democracy. And this democracy supports the idea of expanded opportunities for women in the US
military. According to a 1997 poll conducted by Time magazine, 67 percent of Americans polled supported the
statement that women should be allowed to serve in all combat roles.[14] Even a poll of Texas citizens, arguably
among the most conservative in the nation, found that 57 percent of those surveyed believed women should be allowed
to serve in combat positions.[15]

The fact that the military is based on a meritocracy partially softens emphasis on the group as opposed to the
individual, however. Indeed, one of the greatest strengths of the US military forces is that they are meritocratic; that is,
promotion and other rewards of service are based on demonstrated performance rather than on favoritism and
prejudice.[16] On one hand, it is impossible to create a truly cohesive force without remedying the codified inequity
between genders in the current system. On the other hand, all soldiers, male and female, must be held to the same
standard. This is not always the case today.
Changes in the international system and in the role of the American military in the 21st century make this argument
even more pressing. According to the National Military Strategy of the United States, "The primary purpose of US
armed forces is to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such
threats should deterrence fail. . . . The armed forces' core competence is the ability to apply decisive military power to
deter or defeat aggression and achieve our national security objectives."[17] Those objectives are to "promote peace
and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries. US armed forces advance national security by applying
military power as directed to help shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises, while
we also prepare now for an uncertain future."[18]
This National Military Strategy is dramatically changed from that which prevailed during the Cold War. While
international relations theorists debate whether the end of the Cold War implies the end of history[19] or whether we
are simply returning to the world which existed before World War II and the Cold War,[20] most agree that the current
world order is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.[21] Although the focus of our armed forces must remain
on high-intensity conflict, the likelihood of the United States fighting a conventional great-power conflict is much
lower than it was throughout the last century. Instead, military forces will increasingly focus on responding to
humanitarian emergencies, encouraging the enlargement of the circle of the world's democracies, and preventing
conflicts rather than fighting conventional wars. It appears that men are less willing to serve in these roles than they
were to serve in traditional combat roles during the Cold War, making it even more important that women fill a larger
role in the post-Cold War military.[22] In addition, although men and women agreed in the same numbers that "the
fundamental role of the Army is to fight and win the nation's wars," only 33 percent of women surveyed (versus 57
percent of men surveyed) felt that the "main focus of the Army should be warfighting."[23] Women appear to be more
willing to accept a changing role for the military.
Engaging in these operations--variously referred to as "Operations Other Than War," "Stability and Support
Operations," and "Peace Operations," among other names--presents an environment very different from that of
conventional combat. There no longer exists a forward edge of the battlefield; in these operations anyone, anywhere,
can be a combatant at any time. In fact, given the nature of the missions that the military is likely to be called upon to
perform in the post-Cold War world, women may be at least as well suited as men to serve in all positions.[24]
Practically speaking, women are now being placed in situations remarkably similar to the ones in which men serving
in the combat arms find themselves.[25] Compare the Mission Essential Task List (METL) of a fully integrated
military police unit with that of a mechanized infantry unit that is currently closed to women:

Military Police

Mechanized Infantry

Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

Perform Reconnaissance

Area Security

Assault Mounted and Dismounted
Defend
Support by Fire

Law and Order
Police Intelligence
Internment and Resettlement

Perform Reconnaissance
-

This list of tasks is rather different in conventional war, but in a peace operation such as Kosovo, the differences blur.
Both infantry and military police units deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo today are conducting or are prepared to
conduct very similar missions, given the current operating environment. Military police units and combat arms units
are conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, security operations, resettlement operations, information
collection, and, to a lesser extent, law enforcement.[26] Law enforcement is one of the most dangerous tasks in
Kosovo and remains primarily a military police task. It is worth repeating that women are fully integrated into the
three-person military police teams that constitute an MP company. There is a general consensus that military police
units are performing extremely well in the most critical operations that the Army is conducting today; "nearly every
incident [in a task force in Kosovo] required MP support or action."[27] It remains to be determined whether mission
accomplishment is assisted or hindered by the presence of women in units on the front lines, but it is undeniable that
they are serving now in the same areas of operations as their male counterparts.
Organizational Change in the Military
Tradition-bound and rigidly hierarchical in the popular imagination, military organizations are famous for their
resistance to change. However, military organizations can change when conditions require them to do so; examples
include the adoption of the aircraft carrier, the tank, and amphibious warfare during the interwar period of the
1930s.[28] Cultural change is more difficult to digest and often requires external political influence; the best example
is probably the integration of the armed forces at President Truman's insistence, against the advice of all of the Joint
Chiefs at the time.[29]
While different studies of military change disagree whether military organizations can reform themselves or whether
they require external leadership, most concur that officer leadership is essential for successful change. Where the
officer corps goes, so goes the culture of the military. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies
in a recent examination of American military culture, "The most powerful and direct influence on organizational
culture comes from within the officer corps of the armed forces. Officers turn values into action, bring coherence out
of confusion, set the example, and articulate the viewpoint of the military institution."[30] A Triangle Institute for
Security Studies project states, "Military officers are the custodians and shapers of this organizational culture and
opinion on matters of policy and decisionmaking, and they rise to the most significant positions relevant for policy
interactions with civilian society."[31]
If cultural change is to take place, and that is a significant portion of the gender equality debate, then officers will have
to accept change. If women are to be successfully integrated into combat roles in the US Army that are currently
closed to them, the officer corps of the Army will have to provide leadership and resources to move the institution in
that direction.
A Modest Proposal
Because of these changes in the international system and in the role of armed forces in the post-Cold War world, it is
time to try an experiment: a standards-based integration of female officers into the Army positions currently closed to
them, initially on a small scale.[32] Given the international setting and the resultant changes in military missions, the
reduced distinction between which types of units actually engage the "enemy" by direct ground fire, and the increased
physical ability of women, there is a nearly risk-free opportunity to attempt integration on a small scale. Should the
experiment fail, the costs would be minimal. Should it succeed, the benefits would be great; in addition to increasing
opportunities for women in the military, this policy would actually increase the effectiveness of the Army--in peace
operations, to a lesser extent in conventional war, and in the Army's dealings with its civilian masters.
We admit that this proposal may be perceived to be a bit disingenuous. How would success or failure be proven and
results measured, and if failure was the outcome, would it be possible to remove women from these positions once the
combat-roles Rubicon had been crossed? While these are valid concerns, it would be better for the Army to establish
conditions for integration and run as fair a test as possible of its own volition rather than face the prospect of being
forced to integrate women into combat roles at a time and in a manner not of its own choosing. As with the
Transformation initiative, it is far better for the Army as an organization and for the officer corps as a profession to set
the standards and evaluate the results without external pressure.[33]

As part of this proposal, the Army would be required to establish and to publish physical requirements for all of its
occupational specialties currently closed to women. Only those individuals who meet the standards required to
accomplish the tasks inherent in that military specialty--male or female--would be allowed to serve in that specialty.
Those who do not meet that requirement would not be allowed to serve in that specialty. Periodic testing would ensure
that all of those serving in the specialty maintain themselves in fit condition to continue to meet the demands of that
service specialty.[34]
This requirement is similar to that imposed by police and fire departments across the nation, which require both men
and women to meet the same physical requirements to serve as police and firefighters. The standards are demanding,
and there are relatively few women who meet the requirements; in a recent New York City test, only 11 of the 354
women (3 percent) who passed a written exam were able to pass a demanding physical test that mimics the tasks
required of actual serving firefighters. (By comparison, 57 percent of the 1,016 men who took the physical test met the
standards.) Nonetheless, according to Lieutenant Brenda Berkman, President of the United Women Firefighters, "It
would be wrong to create the impression that the physical exam is an insurmountable barrier for women
applicants."[35]
The New York City Fire Department is attempting to increase female membership, partly in response to a number of
lawsuits alleging discrimination against women. However, the city is not willing to relax the standards, which would
jeopardize public safety. Instead, said Fire Commissioner Thomas Von Essen, "I've got 11,000 firefighters and 10
million people I have to think about every day, so we have to have the most physically capable people. But I believe
we must continue to reach out and find women who are capable and then prepare them for a difficult physical
test."[36]
The authors of this article have similar concerns and suggest a similar standard. Reducing the standards required of
armor, infantry, or special forces officers would jeopardize the safety of soldiers and perhaps ultimately of American
society. However, the functional imperatives of military service cannot be used to justify the exclusion of women who
can meet the physical demands of service in combat arms from those positions.[37] Both authors have had experiences
with male soldiers who were unable to meet the physical, mental, and emotional demands of combat. Standards-based
requirements would solve both problems, and the increasing physical ability of women makes this policy change more
likely to be successful.[38]
There are both potential costs and potential benefits associated with standards-based requirements for service in the
combat arms. Potential costs include the disruptions to unit effectiveness associated with pregnancy; the temporary
organizational turmoil that may result from the policy change, including the cost of instituting physical standards for
all military tasks; a belief in a "softening" of the military ethos; and diminished cohesion in combat units if women are
included. The authors believe that these costs are short term and are outweighed by the longer-term benefits of the
program, which include an expanded pool of military personnel from which to recruit soldiers, more clearly defined
and closely adhered-to standards for all soldiers, and a lessening of the civil-military gap.
Potential Costs of the Policy Change
The experiment we advocate is intended to evaluate the potential costs and benefits we outline in the remainder of this
article. Our findings do not indicate that a large number of women are interested in pursuing the positions commonly
associated with intense fighting. We surveyed 112 female cadets at the Military Academy at West Point and found that
30 percent say that given the opportunity, they would choose a combat arms branch that is currently closed to women.
Only 4 percent would select infantry, the other 26 percent favoring armor and field artillery, branches less associated
with difficult field conditions, physically arduous tasks, and hand-to-hand fighting. The chart below reflects the
reasons women gave for preferring non-combat arms branches.[39]

No interest in combat arms

65 %

Lack of faith in physical capabilities

12 %

Too hard to succeed in male environment

9%

Not best for the Army

8%

Family considerations

5%

What is the significance of these findings? It appears that out of the approximately 400 new female officers that the
Army acquires each year, only about 133 would choose a military occupational specialty that they could not choose
now. Of that number, only five would choose infantry. These numbers are small; they allow an experiment to be run.
Having established the context for the policy proposal we suggest, let's look at the potential problems associated with
full integration of women into all units. The issue of pregnancy is often raised as an insurmountable barrier to the
increased presence of women in the military. The actual numbers belie this. At any given time approximately 13.9
percent of the Army force is temporarily non-deployable. Only 0.79 percent of the Army's force is pregnant at any
given time; however, in certain specialties the pregnancy ratio can be as high as 10 percent of the unit.[40]
One of the authors has witnessed the disruption that pregnancy causes in a deployed unit and suggests that all women
receive and adhere to a birth control regime as part of the "immunizations" required for a deployment. An examination
of past practices reveals many other methods of preventing debilitating medical conditions during deployment. In
Desert Storm, for example, all soldiers were required to stand in formation each day and ingest a pill whose unproven
purpose was to dilute the effects of a chemical weapon attack. If women are aware of a birth control requirement
before enlisting or commissioning there should be no problem; those with a last-minute wish not to comply would be
removed from military service. As for male-female attraction in the units, leaders have the responsibility to handle this
problem as they do all others when they impair mission effectiveness. Anecdotal evidence abounds of relationships
among soldiers in highly successful combat support units.
Organizational turmoil is inherent in any policy change of importance. Perhaps the most likely cause of turmoil if this
policy were to be adopted is an increased likelihood of claims of sexual harassment. More women working in close
proximity to men could equal more claims--some warranted, some not. The problem of increased false claims could be
solved with training.[41] Women must come to realize the circumstances and actions that would imply at least partial
responsibility for an inappropriate encounter.
What is the cost associated with minimum physical fitness standards for all soldiers in a given occupational specialty?
There already exist physical fitness minimums for the Army as a whole, but codified, demonstrable standards do not
exist for each skill. Possible costs include another testing requirement that would be unnecessary without the presence
of women, and the possibility of emphasizing minimum standards instead of maximum standards. However, benefits
exist as well. There are currently some men assigned to tanks, for example, who cannot load main gun rounds fast
enough to meet combat standards. These men would be identified and the performance of the whole unit should
improve when they are reclassified into less physically demanding jobs.[42]
Comparing men's and women's times in the one-mile race shows not only that women are increasing their performance
in physical tasks--beyond the level men could achieve just a few years ago--but also that the gap between men and
women is progressively decreasing. The men's record has dropped 16.8 percent from 4:12.6 set in 1915 to 3:43.13 in
1999, while the women's record has dropped 32.7 percent from 6:13.2 to 4:12.56 in 1996.[43] This performance
increase for women is a function of many factors, including Title IX requirements that schools provide increased
physical opportunities for women. Even stipulating that some percentage of the difference in results achieved by men
and women is biologically determined, this evidence suggests that socialization accounts for more of the difference
than has often been thought.
Some argue that there has been a softening of discipline and training in the military since women began to play a
larger role in the armed forces.[44] The average woman is just plain different--less competitive and aggressive than the
average man.[45] But, in reality, while war is destructive and chaotic, it also requires the highest degree of cooperation
and organization. The violent blood-lusting individual is in fact detrimental to the effectiveness of an organized
fighting force because such a person is uncontrollable and unreliable.[46]
The last problem is one of unit cohesion. While it has been shown that the operational capabilities of a unit are not
weakened by the presence of women,[47] the argument is made by many social scientists that technical proficiency is

not the most important factor to be considered in the expansion of military roles for women. Some feel that male
bonding forged by sleeping, bathing, and eating together--and just plain "letting boys be boys together"--is the key to
unit cohesion and hence the ability to perform as a warrior in battle.[48] However, a 1997 RAND study for the
Secretary of Defense found that "gender differences alone did not appear to erode cohesion. Cohesion was reported
high in units where people believed the command emphasized unity and the importance and necessity of all members
and divisions in accomplishing the mission."[49] Importantly, the study emphasized the differences between social and
task cohesion: "High social cohesion, or bonding on a social level, can have deleterious effects on performance
outcomes and task cohesion, because people start to prioritize friendship and social activities over performing their
jobs."[50]
It is not necessary to like someone to work effectively with him or her. Survey research has indicated that 72 percent
of Army officers, questioned whether "the proportion of women to men at work matters to you," said, "It doesn't
matter."[51] The experience of women in the US Coast Guard supports this argument. Colonel Joe Collins, USA Ret.,
who has researched American military culture for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that "the
Coast Guard, which was the first service to integrate women and has women serving in all mission areas, is the only
service which has no disparities between male and female perceptions of female effectiveness."[52] Longitudinal
studies of Army attitudes support this point; while a 1988 survey showed a "significant negative correlation between
percentage of women in the workplace and horizontal cohesion among male junior enlisted soldiers," a more recent
1995 study demonstrated no significant relationship between women in the work group and unit cohesion.[53]
Yet we find that this last problem is the one most commonly considered insurmountable. The argument can be stated
in this manner: "We don't know what the integration of women will do to the cohesion of our combat units, but we do
know that the kind of cohesion we have works. It's risky and the cost in national security terms may not be worth the
benefit for the few women who want this kind of a challenge." We agree that there is a risk. But given the current
international setting and the small numbers of units that would be initially affected, we believe it is worth a genuine
try.
Benefits of the Policy Change
We have acknowledged some short-term and potential longer-term costs of changing current policy to allow women to
serve in combat units, and noted that some disadvantages are actually potential benefits of the policy change. Other
benefits include more clearly defined and more closely enforced standards and a diminished civil-military gap.
One of the principal benefits of the policy change would be an increased focus on the physical standards required to
perform the tasks of any military job--for both male and female soldiers. The Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) was
designed to assess general fitness and wellness, not to determine suitability for specific jobs.[54] It remains necessary,
however, to address the current inequity between the standards for men and women. One of the authors of this article,
Major Field, does not have to train on a regular basis to achieve the maximum standard (two miles in 15 minutes, 54
seconds for women in her age group) on the running event of the APFT. However, in order to run the 13 minutes, 18
seconds needed to achieve the maximum standard for men in the age group of the other author, Major Nagl, almost
every man has to train.[55] This is harmful in two ways: the lower requirements for women appear to constitute a
double standard (which causes resentment), and it appears that women have less physical stamina than they really do.
The military should be clear about what physical strength is required in the performance of each duty and hold all
soldiers in that specialty to that standard; doing so will increase the ability of the fighting force as a whole. Imposing
and enforcing job-related standards on all service members would help to resolve these perceptual problems,
reinforcing the idea of a meritocracy, increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces, and helping to resolve
current recruiting and retention problems, which result in part from the growing civil-military gap.
In that latter regard, recent authors have made much of what they perceive to be a growing gap between the military
and the civilian spheres in the United States. It is essential that the military continue to have the support of the civilian
leadership, and that any limitations on individual liberty be perceived to be fair and required by the military's
functional imperative. It appears that there is large disparity between public and military sentiment on the issue of full
gender equality in the armed forces. Only 35 percent of military officers support direct combat roles for women,

compared to 58 percent of civilian elites.[56] Should the military agree that the national security needs of the United
States in the post-Cold War world have changed enough to allow the democratic ideals and principles of society to
assert themselves within the distinctive mission and culture of the military, the gap would be lessened to some degree.
Liberty and Justice for All?
Changes in the international environment have moved the balance point between individual liberty and the military's
functional imperative. The time has come to permit female officers to serve in the combat arms branches if they are
able to meet the physical requirements of that branch. Anything less is a betrayal of the very democratic principles
which members of the American military have sworn to support and defend.
The number of women entering combat arms would be small, at least initially, and therefore there would be ample
opportunity to sort out some quantifiable problems. If these are solved and this experiment proves successful, we
should then move without trepidation toward full integration of women. It is essential that the experiment be run; as
the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces pointed out, "There are no
authoritative military studies of mixed-gender ground combat cohesion, since available cohesion research has been
conducted among male-only ground combat units."[57] If the experiment proves successful, it could be expanded in an
orderly fashion--and without damaging the combat readiness of the armed forces.
We need to distinguish between arriving at real solutions to real problems and waiting for some to overcome an
emotional bias that is petty and destructive. Most of all, we should make an effort to de-radicalize the issue.[58] If we
find that gender integration of the combat arms is fraught with insurmountable problems, that the costs were higher
than we thought and the benefits less, then equity for women in the armed forces is not achievable. So be it. Military
service at its best remains about selfless service to the country, and no one knows this better than the men and women
who serve today.
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